The Biden administration has been in power for more than two years but still lacks an Iran policy established for 2023. Meanwhile, Tehran is not standing still. The Islamic Republic armed Russia with drones for use against the EU candidate country Ukraine, the consensus of the P5 + 1 – which created the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – no longer exists, and neither does the basic bargain underpinning the 2015 agreement.
These trendlines and the rapidly approaching October expiration of UN sanctions on the Islamic Republic’s missile program under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, require an urgent rethink. also a broader US policy on Iran. The way to start is to impanel a bipartisan committee to advise on a strong strategy.
The Biden administration began its tenure focused on returning to mutual compliance with the JCPOA, which it then promised to use as a launchpad for a longer and stronger agreement. Many analysts, including this author, doubt that this agreement can be revived and declare that endless diplomacy without credible coercive options will fail. That proved to be correct.
In November 2022, the president was caught on tape saying that the JCPOA was dead, but “we’re not going to announce it.” But this reluctance to formally declare that the JCPOA era has ended coupled with the president not having made a significant set of statements on Iran policy since taking office has inevitably sparked criticism and confusion. . Congress is also not to blame here, since so far there has not been a public hearing on the administration specifically focused on Iran policy since the US special envoy testified in May despite the rapidly changing landscape. Finally, there is more silence than substance coming from Washington on Iran.
But the Biden administration and Congress have options, and one would look to US China policy as a model. Ironically, American lawmakers are more likely to find bipartisanship in the threat from Beijing, the most strategic challenge facing Washington, than Tehran. Recently, the US House of Representatives formed a Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. Its mission is to develop a holistic, whole-of-government approach as a framework to guide US policy.
Members of the US Senate have also proposed the creation of a Grand Strategy Commission on China with a similar mission. If formed, it will consist of 20 members, including two co-chairs to be chosen by Congress and the president; six members of the executive branch; two US senators and two members of the House of Representatives; and eight members in the private sector.
This type of framework should also be developed for Iran policy. A bipartisan, bicameral joint select committee or commission could be established to guide US policy on how to counter the Islamic Republic comprehensively – both nuclear and non-nuclear. Experts and activists should also be consulted, including the Iranian American community, which has shown an unprecedented level of activism on Iranian policy amid the demonstrations in Iran last year.
This can be seen in its rallying to the MAHSA Act, which will eventually see the US government impose sanctions related to human rights and terrorism on Iran’s supreme leader and president. The diaspora gathered more than 100 co-sponsors of the law in the US House of Representatives – from progressives to conservatives. Likewise, the chairman and ranking member of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee recently lent their support to the new Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports Act.
While these steps do not include the hard choices that a committee or commission must grapple with — including red lines for military action — they show the interest and promise of more bipartisanship on Iran that exists. Unity is not possible. But a healthier margin of cross-party support is possible. A structure must be in place to harness its potential.
One of the main reasons that the JCPOA did not survive was the lack of bipartisan consensus on an acceptable strategy for Iran. The US diplomats negotiating it are more aligned with European views than most elected American lawmakers, not to mention traditional Middle Eastern allies.
However, history unfortunately repeated itself in 2023. On May 4, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan gave statements emphasizing that the Biden administration “is sidelined by allies and partners who have fundamentally bought into our strategy. And that includes our allies and partners in Europe who have joined us on the prevention side and on the diplomacy side. But what about the US Congress? It wasn’t discussed even once, and many lawmakers didn’t buy into the strategy. The more said so just this month, senior Biden administration officials held the first Iran-focused classified briefing for all US senators since taking office more than two years ago.
A key lesson to be learned from the demise of the JCPOA is that the failure to engage and do the political legwork in Washington before committing the United States to major international agreements is a recipe for collapse. diplomacy. This resulted in familiar complaints in the Iran debate of name-calling and slogans but no strategy. The Biden administration and Congress have an opportunity for a reset on Iran policy. They should use it.
Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute’s Iran Program. His research focus includes leadership dynamics in Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its proxy and partner networks, and Iran’s relationship with Israel.
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